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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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_____________ 
 
No. 14-4193 
_____________ 
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Individually and as Personal Representative  
of the Estate of David Sikkelee, deceased, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PRECISION AIRMOTIVE CORPORATION;  
PRECISION AIRMOTIVE LLC, 
Individually and as Successor-In-Interest 
to Precision Airmotive Corporation;  
BURNS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 
Individually and as Successor-In-Interest to Borg-Warner 
Corporation, and Marvel-Schebler, a Division of  
Borg-Warner Corporation;  
TEXTRON LYCOMING RECIPROCATING  
ENGINE DIVISION, A Division of Avco Corporation;  
AVCO CORPORATION; KELLY AEROSPACE, INC., 
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KELLY AEROSPACE POWER SYSTEMS, INC., 
Individually and as Joint Venturer and Successor-In-Interest 
a/k/a Electrosystems, Inc. 
a/k/a Confuel Inc.; 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION  
_____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 This case presents the question whether Abdullah v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999), in 
which we held that federal law preempts the field of aviation 
safety, extends to state law products liability claims.  We hold 
it does not.  In light of principles of federalism and the 
presumption against preemption, Congress must express its 
clear and manifest intent to preempt an entire field of state 
law.  Here, none of the relevant statutes or regulations signals 
such an intent.  To the contrary, the Federal Aviation Act, the 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, and the 
regulations promulgated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration reflect that Congress did not intend to 
preempt aircraft products liability claims in a categorical way.  
The District Court faithfully sought to apply our precedent, 
and while it concluded that state products liability claims are 
preempted by Abdullah, it also recognized the question was 
sufficiently unclear and important to certify its order for 
interlocutory review.  Today, we clarify the scope of 
Abdullah and hold that neither the Act nor the issuance of a 
type certificate per se preempts all aircraft design and 
manufacturing claims.  Rather, subject to traditional 
principles of conflict preemption, including in connection 
with the specifications expressly set forth in a given type 
certificate, aircraft products liability cases like Appellant’s 
may proceed using a state standard of care.  For these reasons, 
we will reverse the District Court’s entry of summary 
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judgment in favor of Appellees and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I. Background 
 A.  Overview of Federal Aviation Regulation 
 Almost immediately after the airplane became a viable 
means of transportation, it became clear that certain aspects 
of aviation, such as air traffic control, required uniform 
federal oversight.  See Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 
44 Stat. 568.  Congress soon thereafter expanded federal 
control over aviation by enacting the Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938, which created the Civil Aeronautics Authority 
(“CAA”) to oversee the regulatory aspects of aviation safety 
and to prescribe “minimum standards governing the design . . 
. of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be 
required in the interest of safety.”  Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, 1007.  The 1938 Act also 
authorized the CAA to issue so-called “type certificates,” 
“production certificate[s],” and “airworthiness certificate[s]” 
if an airplane or airplane part complied with the relevant 
safety regulations.  Id. at 1007, 1009-10.   
 As the scope of federal involvement in regulating 
aviation expanded, so too did the number of governmental 
bodies regulating aviation, and by the 1950s, there had, at one 
point, been seventy-five different interagency groups with 
some responsibility in the field.  S. Rep. No. 85-1811, at 6 
(1958).  To resolve this problem, Congress enacted the 1958 
Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, to 
consolidate regulatory authority in a single entity: the Federal 
Aviation Administration (“FAA”).  The Federal Aviation Act 
adopted verbatim from the Civil Aeronautics Act the statutory 
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framework for the promulgation of minimum standards for 
design safety and the process for the issuance of certificates 
that indicated compliance with those regulations. 1  
 Pursuant to the statutory framework established in the 
Civil Aeronautics Act and adopted by the Federal Aviation 
Act, aircraft engine manufacturers must obtain from the FAA 
(1) a type certificate, which certifies that a new design for an 
aircraft or aircraft part performs properly and meets the safety 
standards defined in the aviation regulations, 49 U.S.C.          
§ 44704(a); 14 C.F.R. § 21.31; and (2) a production 
certificate, which certifies that a duplicate part produced for a 
particular plane will conform to the design in the type 
certificate, 49 U.S.C. § 44704(c); 14 C.F.R. § 21.137.  Before 
a new aircraft may legally fly, it must also receive (3) an 
airworthiness certificate, which certifies that the plane and its 
component parts conform to its type certificate and are in 
condition for safe operation.  49 U.S.C. §§ 44704(d), 
44711(a)(1).   
 The FAA issues a type certificate when it has 
determined that a product “is properly designed and 
                                              
1 The only difference between these portions of the 
two Acts is that the Federal Aviation Act replaced the word 
“Authority”—referring to the Civil Aviation Authority 
created by the 1938 Act—with “Administrator,” which refers 
to the appointed head of the Authority’s successor 
organization, the Federal Aviation Administration.  See also 
H.R. Rep. 85-2360, at 16 (1958) (reflecting that, except for 
certain enumerated changes, “TITLE VI. SAFETY 
REGULATION OF CIVIL AERONAUTICS [of the Federal 
Aviation Act] . . . is a reenactment of existing law without 
substantial change”). 
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manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations 
and minimum standards prescribed under [49 U.S.C. §] 
44701(a).”  49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1); see also 14 C.F.R. 
§ 21.21.  A type certificate includes the type design, which 
outlines the detailed specifications, dimensions, and materials 
used for a given product; the product’s operating limitations; 
a “certificate data sheet,” which denotes the conditions and 
limitations necessary to meet airworthiness requirements; and 
any other conditions or limitations prescribed under FAA 
regulations.  See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.31, 21.41; FAA, Order 
8110.4C, change 5, Type Certification, ch. 3-3(a) (2011).  
This certification process can be intensive and painstaking; 
for example, a commercial aircraft manufacturer seeking a 
new type certificate for a wide-body aircraft might submit 
300,000 drawings, 2,000 engineering reports, and 200 other 
reports in addition to completing approximately 80 ground 
tests and 1,600 hours of flight tests.  See United States v. S.A. 
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 
467 U.S. 797, 805 n.7 (1984).  A type certificate remains in 
effect “until surrendered, suspended, revoked, or a 
termination date is otherwise established by the FAA.”  14 
C.F.R. § 21.51.  A manufacturer may make both “major” and 
“minor” changes to a type certificated design, 14 C.F.R. 
§ 21.93, but must obtain the appropriate regulatory approval 
to do so, which for “major changes” requires the issuance of 
an amended or supplemental type certificate by the FAA, see 
49 U.S.C. § 44704(b); 14 C.F.R. § 21.97; FAA Order 
8110.4C, change 1, Type Certification, ch. 4-1(a), 4-2 (2011), 
and for “minor changes” requires the manufacturer to comply 
with a pertinent “method acceptable to the FAA,” 14 C.F.R. 
§ 21.95. 
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 B.  Factual History 
 This case involves alleged manufacturing and design 
defects in a Textron Lycoming O-320-D2C engine (“the 
engine”) manufactured in 1969 and installed “factory new” 
on a Cessna 172N aircraft (“the aircraft”) in 1998.  Lycoming 
holds both a type certificate and production certificate for the 
engine.  The engine in the aircraft was overhauled in 2004 
and installed with a MA-4SPA carburetor in accordance with 
Lycoming’s type-certificated design.  
 David Sikkelee was piloting the aircraft when it 
crashed shortly after taking off from Transylvania County 
Airport in Brevard, North Carolina in July 2005.  Sikkelee 
was killed as a result of serious injuries and burns he suffered 
in the crash.  His wife, Jill Sikkelee, the Plaintiff-Appellant in 
this case, alleges that the aircraft lost power and crashed as a 
result of a malfunction or defect in the engine’s carburetor.  
Specifically, she contends that, “due to the faulty design of 
the lock tab washers as well as gasket set,” vibrations from 
the engine loosened screws holding the carburetor’s throttle 
body to its float bowl.  J.A. 643.  When properly functioning, 
a carburetor regulates the mixture of fuel and air that enters 
the engine’s cylinders.  According to Sikkelee, however, the 
manner by which the throttle body was attached to the float 
bowl in the Textron Lycoming O-320-D2C engine allowed 
raw fuel to leak out of the carburetor into the engine and 
thereby caused the aircraft to crash.   
 C.  Procedural History 
 Sikkelee initially filed a wrongful death and survival 
action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in 2007 against 
seventeen defendants, asserting state law claims of strict 
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liability, breach of warranty, negligence, misrepresentation, 
and concert of action.  In 2010, the District Court granted 
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding 
that Sikkelee’s state law claims, which were premised on 
state law standards of care, fell within the preempted “field of 
air safety” described in Abdullah.  Sikkelee v. Precision 
Airmotive Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d 431, 435 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 
(quoting Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367).  Sikkelee subsequently 
filed an amended complaint, continuing to assert state law 
claims, but this time incorporating federal standards of care 
by alleging violations of numerous FAA regulations.2  
Following certain settlements and motion practice, Sikkelee 
narrowed her claims against Lycoming to defective design 
(under theories of both negligence and strict liability) and 
failure to warn.3   
                                              
2 As summarized by the District Court, Sikkelee 
specifically alleged that Lycoming had violated, at least, the 
following regulations: Civil Air Regulations (CARs)            
§§ 13.100, 13.101, 13.104, 13.110 (1964); 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.2, 
21.3, 21.14, 21.21, 21.303, 33.4, 33.15, 33.19, 33.35, 
145.221(a) (2004).  As described by the District Court, CARs 
were precursors to modern day Federal Aviation Regulations 
codified in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  
Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 440 n.9 (citing a description of the 
history of aviation regulations found in 2 Kreindler, Aviation 
Accident Law § 9.01(1)-(2) (Matthew Bender)). 
 
3 The case then took a detour to this Court to determine 
whether the Second or Third Restatement of Torts applied to 
products liability cases.  In denying the petition for 
interlocutory appeal, we clearly indicated that the Third 
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 As the trial date approached, the District Court 
expressed concern that Sikkelee’s proposed jury instructions 
using federal standards of care were “all but completely 
unable to assist the Court in . . . formulating an intelligible 
statement of applicable law.”  Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 437 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (recounting its position on 
this point as first expressed in its Memorandum of November 
20, 2013).  On the one hand, the District Court asserted that, 
under Abdullah, it was bound to apply some federal standard 
of care and that compliance with the applicable design and 
construction regulations was the only identifiable, let alone 
articulable, federal standard.  On the other hand, because it 
determined that the “FAA regulations relating to the design 
and manufacture of airplanes and airplane component parts 
were never intended to create federal standards of care,” id. at 
437 n.4 (quoting Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 4:10-cv-
00843, 2011 WL 6339833, at *22 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2011) 
(Conner, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the District 
Court found it to be “arduous and impractical” to fashion the 
regulations themselves into such standards, id. (quoting 
Pease, 2011 WL 6339833, at *23) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Faced with this conundrum, the District Court 
ordered Sikkelee to submit additional briefing on the question 
of the appropriate standard of care and, after review of that 
briefing, invited Lycoming to file a motion for summary 
judgment.  Id. at 438.   
                                                                                                     
Restatement applied.  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 
No. 12-8081, 2012 WL 5077571 (3d Cir. Oct. 17, 2012).  At 
that point, the case was reassigned from Judge John E. Jones 
III to Judge Matthew W. Brann.   
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 In its ruling on that motion, the District Court 
concluded that the federal standard of care was established in 
the type certificate itself.  Reasoning that the FAA issues a 
type certificate based on its determination that the 
manufacturer has complied with the pertinent regulations, the 
District Court held that the FAA’s issuance of a type 
certificate for the Textron Lycoming O-320-D2C engine 
meant that the federal standard of care had been satisfied as a 
matter of law.  Id. at 451-43, 456.  The District Court 
therefore granted Lycoming’s summary judgment motion, in 
part, on that basis.  Id. at 456.  The District Court denied 
summary judgment, however, on Sikkelee’s failure to warn 
claims, which were premised on Lycoming’s alleged 
violation of 14 C.F.R. § 21.3 for failure to “‘report any 
failure, malfunction, or defect in any product, part, process, or 
article’” that Lycoming manufactured.4  Id. at 459-60 
(quoting 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(a) (2004)). 
 Recognizing that its grant of partial summary 
judgment raised novel and complex questions concerning the 
reach of Abdullah and the scope of preemption in the airlines 
industry, the District Court certified the order for immediate 
appeal, and we granted interlocutory review. 
                                              
 4 Upon receiving a report that a product has 
malfunctioned or contains a defect, the FAA may issue a 
legally enforceable airworthiness directive that specifies 
“inspections you must carry out, conditions and limitations 
you must comply with, and any actions you must take to 
resolve an unsafe condition.”  14 C.F.R. § 39.11; see also 14 
C.F.R. §§ 39.3, 39.5.  Any further operation of an aircraft in 
contravention of an airworthiness directive is a violation of 
federal law.  14 C.F.R. §§ 39.7, 39.9. 
13 
 
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.   
§ 1292(b) to review the order certified by the District Court 
for interlocutory appeal.  We review the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment de novo.   Azur v. Chase Bank, 
USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  We also 
review questions of preemption de novo.  Farina v. Nokia 
Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 n.20 (3d Cir. 2010).  
III.  Discussion 
 The doctrine of preemption is a necessary but 
precarious component of our system of federalism under 
which the states and the federal government possess 
concurrent sovereignty, subject to the limitation that federal 
law is “the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Consistent with 
this principle, Congress has the power to enact legislation that 
preempts state law.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2500-01 (2012).  At the same time, with due respect to 
our constitutional scheme built upon a “compound republic,” 
with power allocated between “two distinct governments,” 
The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), there is a strong presumption against preemption 
in areas of the law that States have traditionally occupied, see 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that, “[w]hen faced with two equally plausible 
readings of statutory text, [courts] have a duty to accept the 
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reading that disfavors preemption” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  For that reason, all preemption cases “start with 
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, 518 
U.S. at 485) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Congressional intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of a 
preemption analysis.  Id.  Thus, when confronted with the 
question of whether state claims are preempted, as we are 
here, we look to the language, structure, and purpose of the 
relevant statutory and regulatory scheme to develop a 
“reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress 
intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to 
affect business, consumers, and the law.”  Medtronic, 515 
U.S. at 486; see also Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 243-44 
(recognizing that divining congressional intent regarding 
preemption requires considering a law’s “structure and 
purpose,” underlying “object and policy,” and, where 
relevant, legislative history (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 Congress may exert its supremacy by expressly 
preempting state law, but it may also do so implicitly, which 
we have recognized in limited circumstances in the doctrine 
of “field” preemption.  See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015).  For that doctrine to apply, “we must 
find that federal law leaves no room for state regulation and 
that Congress had a clear and manifest intent to supersede 
state law” in that field.  Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 
119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Holk v. Snapple Beverage 
Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009)) (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Where Congress expresses 
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an intent to occupy an entire field, States are foreclosed from 
adopting any regulation in that area, regardless of whether 
that action is consistent with federal standards.  Oneok, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1595.   
In addition to field preemption, federal law may 
supersede state law through conflict preemption.  This occurs 
when a state law conflicts with federal law such that 
compliance with both state and federal regulations is 
impossible, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 
(2011), or when a challenged state law “stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of a federal law,” Williamson v. Mazda Motor of 
Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 330 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).    
In this case, we are asked to analyze the extent to 
which federal aviation law preempts state tort law, 
specifically, products liability claims for defective design.  
We do not write on a blank slate, but rather, against the 
backdrop of our decision in Abdullah v. American Airlines, 
Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999). 
A. Abdullah 
 In Abdullah, we considered the preemptive effect of 
federal in-flight seatbelt regulations on state law negligence 
claims for a flight crew’s failure to warn passengers that their 
flight would encounter severe turbulence.  Id. at 365.  One of 
the plane’s crew members had illuminated the fasten seatbelt 
sign in accordance with the federal regulations, but none of 
the crew had given the passengers an additional verbal 
warning of expected turbulence.  Id. at 365, 371 & n.11.  
When the turbulence hit, the plaintiffs suffered serious 
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injuries.  Id. at 365.  After the jury found American Airlines 
liable and awarded the plaintiffs damages, the district court 
ordered a new trial, holding that the Federal Aviation Act 
preempted the territorial standards for aviation safety, and 
thus, that the jury should not have been instructed on a 
territorial standard of care.  Id. at 365-66.  We affirmed, 
explaining that the Federal Aviation Act and federal 
regulations “establish complete and thorough safety standards 
for interstate and international air transportation and that 
these standards are not subject to supplementation by, or 
variation among, jurisdictions.”  Id. at 365.  Although we held 
that federal law preempts state law standards of care in the 
field of air safety, we also held that it preserves state law 
remedies.  Id. at 364.  As such, within the field of air safety, 
Abdullah instructs that plaintiffs may bring state law causes 
of action that incorporate federal standards of care.  Id. at 
365. 
 Our analysis in reaching this conclusion focused on the 
text and legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act, which 
was adopted primarily to promote safety in aviation and gave 
the FAA broad authority to issue safety regulations.  Id. at 
368-69.  We observed that the FAA, in exercising this 
authority, “has implemented a comprehensive system of rules 
and regulations, which promotes flight safety by regulating 
pilot certification, pilot pre-flight duties, pilot flight 
responsibilities, and flight rules.”  Id. at 369 (footnotes 
omitted).  We then reviewed several cases from the Supreme 
Court and our sister Circuits that had found federal 
preemption with regard to discrete matters of in-flight 
operations, including aircraft noise, City of Burbank v. 
Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); pilot 
regulation, French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st 
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Cir. 1989); and control of flights through navigable airspace, 
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d 
Cir. 1977).  Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369-71.  We paid special 
heed to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a), which proscribes “operat[ing] 
an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger 
the life or property of another,” and observed that it provided 
a catch-all standard of care.  Id. at 371.5  Thus, we concluded 
that state law standards of care within the “field of aviation 
safety” were preempted, and we instructed that “a court must 
refer . . . to the overall concept that aircraft may not be 
operated in a careless or reckless manner” in addition to any 
specific regulations that may be applicable.  Id. 
 Importantly for our purposes, although we stated in 
broad terms that the Federal Aviation Act preempted the 
“field of aviation safety,” id., the regulations and decisions 
we discussed in Abdullah all related to in-air operations, see 
14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (“Operate, with respect to aircraft, means use, 
cause to use or authorize to use aircraft, for the purpose . . . of 
air navigation including the piloting of aircraft . . . .”), and the 
catch-all standard of care that we held a court “must refer to” 
applied only to operating, not designing or manufacturing, an 
aircraft.  See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 91.13.   
 We confirmed the limits of our holding in Abdullah a 
decade later in Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 121, where we clarified 
that a flight crew’s oversight of the disembarkation of 
                                              
5 The full text of this regulation reads: “Aircraft 
operations for the purpose of air navigation.  No person may 
operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to 
endanger the life or property of another.”  14 C.F.R. 
§ 91.13(a). 
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passengers after an airplane came to a complete stop at its 
destination was not within the preempted field of aviation 
safety.  By drawing a line between what happens during flight 
and what happens upon disembarking, we made clear that the 
field of aviation safety described in Abdullah was limited to 
in-air operations.  Id. at 127-31 (“[T]he [Federal Aviation 
Act’s] safety provisions appear to be principally concerned 
with safety in connection with operations associated with 
flight.” (emphasis added)).  Abdullah thus does not govern 
products liability claims like those at issue here. 6  Indeed, as 
discussed further below, products liability claims are not 
subject to the same catch-all standard of care that motivated 
our field preemption decision in Abdullah; the design 
regulations governing the issuance of type certificates are not 
as comprehensive as the regulations governing pilot 
certification, pilot pre-flight duties, pilot flight 
responsibilities, and flight rules discussed there; and our post-
Abdullah case law cautions us against interpreting the scope 
of the preempted field too broadly.  See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 
131. 
This conclusion is consistent with other courts that 
have interpreted Abdullah.  For example, the Ninth Circuit, 
which had previously adopted Abdullah’s conclusion that the 
Federal Aviation Act preempts state law standards of care in 
                                              
6 Appellees point to our passing reference in Elassaad 
that the certification and airworthiness requirements for 
aircraft parts concern aspects of air safety.  613 F.3d at 128.  
The certification process, however, had no relevance to the 
pertinent issues in Elassaad, so this statement constituted 
dicta.  See In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion 
Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 583-84 n.18 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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the field of aviation safety, has held that products liability 
does not fall within that preempted field.  Martin ex rel. 
Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 
809-11 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.).  Even the district courts 
that believed Abdullah compelled them to extend the 
preempted field to products liability claims, including the 
District Court in this case, have noted that such a holding was 
at odds with the federal regulatory scheme governing aviation 
design and manufacturing.  See Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 
460 (“Yet having endeavored to reconcile Abdullah with the 
federal regulatory scheme that governs aviation design and 
manufacturing, this Court—either by way of its own error or 
that of the precedents it has followed—has reached holdings 
that it imagines have little to do with Congressional intent.”); 
see also Pease, 2011 WL 6339833, at *22-23 (stating that 
Abdullah’s reasoning is overbroad). 
Having concluded that Abdullah does not control here, 
we must now determine whether Congress intended the 
Federal Aviation Act to preempt products liability claims. 
B. Whether the Presumption Against Preemption 
Applies 
 Typically, our preemption analysis begins with the 
presumption that Congress does not preempt areas of law 
traditionally occupied by the states unless that is its clear and 
manifest intent.  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565.  In this case, 
Appellees argue that the presumption against preemption 
should not apply in the aviation context given the history of 
federal involvement in the field.  That argument turns, 
however, on a selective view of history. 
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In general, products liability claims are exemplars of 
traditional state law causes of action.  See Medtronic, 518 
U.S. at 491.  Indeed, state law governed the earliest products 
liability claims in this country.  See, e.g., Curtain v. Somerset, 
21 A. 244, 244-45 (Pa. 1891) (applying Pennsylvania law); 
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 407-11 (N.Y.  1852) 
(applying New York law); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, On 
Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 699, 
732-44 (1936) (discussing distinctions between the early 
products liability law of the various States). 
 More specifically, even aviation torts have been 
consistently governed by state law.  In The Crawford Bros. 
No. 2, 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914), which appears to be 
the earliest tort case involving an aircraft, the court 
considered the effect of the “legal code of the air” that had 
been proposed by the International Juridic Committee on 
Aviation on a salvage claim related to an airplane crash in 
Puget Sound.  Id. at 269-70.  The court posited that, if the 
code had become law, “it would be important to consider its 
provisions in determining what was reasonable and proper in 
a cause involving air craft in a common-law action,” much 
like with rules governing water craft.  Id. at 270.  The court 
ultimately dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, as 
neither the proposed legal code of the air nor maritime law 
provided for jurisdiction, and instructed that such questions 
“must be relegated to the common-law courts.”  Id. at 271.  
The decision in Crawford Bros. thus recognized that, absent 
specific legislation, the common law governed aviation tort 
claims. 
  Years later, after Congress passed the 1926 Air 
Commerce Act but before the current type certification 
regime was imposed, Judge Buffington authored what 
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appears to be this Court’s first decision involving an aviation-
related tort claim, Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 
F.2d 710 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 696 (1933).  There, 
a widow brought suit against the Curtiss-Wright Flying 
Service, an early airline, after her husband was killed in a 
plane crash as a result of negligent operation.  Id. at 711.  We 
analyzed the claims under common law negligence standards, 
see id. at 712, as no specific legislation or regulation 
governed those claims.  Of course, because that decision 
preceded Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 
our analysis turned on federal, rather than state, common law, 
but the distinction is not important for our purposes here.  
Rather, our decision reflects that despite the emergence of 
federal statutes governing aviation, the common law 
continued to apply to aviation torts.   
 Since then, in the absence of applicable statutory or 
regulatory provisions, we have consistently applied state law 
to tort claims arising from airplane crashes.  Only a month 
before the Federal Aviation Act was enacted, we were faced 
with a case involving three claims of defective design against 
an aircraft manufacturer after its plane broke apart in midair.  
Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602, 603-04 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).  In concluding that 
the aircraft manufacturer did not negligently design the plane, 
we did not exclusively rely on the Civil Aeronautics Board’s 
certification of the relevant design, but rather methodically 
considered each design defect claim under a common law 
negligence standard, using the type certificate as but a part of 
that overall analysis.  Id. at 605-07; see also Nw. Airlines v. 
Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 124 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. 
denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956) (confirming the district court’s 
decision to leave the question of a manufacturer’s negligent 
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design to the jury for determination of whether the pertinent 
state standard of ordinary care was met).   
 We have done the same in the years since the Federal 
Aviation Act replaced the Civil Aeronautics Act, see, e.g., 
Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976, 978-82 (3d 
Cir. 1972) (applying a state standard of care to claims for 
strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty arising 
from an airplane crash caused by the collapse of the plane’s 
right wing); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 236-
37 (3d Cir. 1964) (rejecting defendant’s argument that 
approval by the Civil Aeronautics Administration of an 
airplane’s propeller system was conclusive of compliance 
with the standard of care), as have other Courts of Appeals, 
see, e.g., Martin, 555 F.3d at 808; Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
484 F.3d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2007); McLennan v. Am. 
Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 426 (5th Cir. 2001); In re 
Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1996); Pub. 
Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 293-95 
(11th Cir. 1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 
1438, 1441-47 (10th Cir. 1993); In re N-500L Cases, 691 
F.2d 15, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1982); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1969); 
Banko v. Cont’l Motors Corp., 373 F.2d 314, 315-16 (4th Cir. 
1966). 
 Consistent with the uniform treatment of aviation 
products liability cases as state law torts, we expressly held in 
Elassaad that the presumption against preemption applies in 
the aviation context.7  See 613 F.3d at 127 (“When 
                                              
7 The Tenth Circuit rejected the application of the 
presumption against preemption in the air operations context 
on the ground that “the field of aviation safety has long been 
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considering preemption of an area of traditional state 
regulation, we begin our analysis by applying a presumption 
against preemption. . . .  [I]t is appropriate to use a restrained 
approach in recognizing the preemption of common law torts 
in the field of aviation.” (quoting Holk, 575 F.3d at 334) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 
366 (“[We] have addressed claims of preemption with the 
starting presumption that Congress does not intend to 
supplant state law.”).  Appellees’ attempts to set the 
presumption aside are therefore unavailing.   
 With this presumption in mind, we must determine 
whether Congress expressed its clear and manifest intent to 
preempt aviation products liability claims.  We do so by 
reviewing the text and structure of the Federal Aviation Act, 
and, to the extent necessary and relevant to this statute, 
examining subsequent congressional action that sheds light on 
its intent.  See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485-86.  We also 
consider relevant regulations that have been issued pursuant 
to the valid exercise of the FAA’s delegated authority, which 
can have the same preemptive effect as federal statutes.  See 
Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
                                                                                                     
dominated by federal interests.”  See US Airways, Inc. v. 
O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For the reasons discussed above, 
we respectfully disagree. 
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C. Indicia of Congressional Intent  
1. The Federal Aviation Act 
 As we have explained, although the federal 
government has overseen certain aspects of aviation, such as 
air traffic control and pilot certification, since the early days 
of flight, see Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 
568, there was little question when the Civil Aeronautics Act 
was adopted in 1938 that common law standards governed 
tort claims arising from plane crashes, see, e.g., Curtiss-
Wright Flying Serv., 66 F.2d at 711-13 (applying the common 
law standard for negligence).  It is therefore significant that 
the Federal Aviation Act, which succeeded the Civil 
Aeronautics Act and remains the foundation of federal 
aviation law today, contains no express preemption provision.  
In fact, it says only that the FAA may establish “minimum 
standards” for aviation safety, 49 U.S.C. § 44701—statutory 
language the Supreme Court has held in other contexts to be 
insufficient on its own to support a finding of clear and 
manifest congressional intent of preemption, see Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145 (1963); see 
also Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168 n.19 (1978); 
Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373-74; Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445. 
Further, the Federal Aviation Act contains a “savings 
clause,” which provides that “[a] remedy under this part is in 
addition to any other remedies provided by law.”8  49 U.S.C. 
§ 40120(c) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court observed 
                                              
8 There is no question that state law provides remedies 
for products liability claims.  See, e.g., Tincher v. Omega 
Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014). 
 
25 
 
that this statutory scheme permits states to retain their 
traditional regulatory power over aspects of aviation.  See 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 
(1992) (noting that the Federal Aviation Act’s savings clause 
permitted the States to regulate intrastate airfares and enforce 
their own laws against deceptive trade practices prior to the 
1978 enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act, which did 
expressly preempt state laws relating to the rates, routes, or 
services of an air carrier).  While the inclusion of the savings 
clause “is not inconsistent” with a requirement that courts 
apply federal standards of care when adjudicating state law 
claims, Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 374-75, it belies Appellees’ 
argument that Congress demonstrated a clear and manifest 
intent to preempt state law products liability claims 
altogether. 
 Whereas Appellees must show a clear and manifest 
congressional intent to overcome the presumption against 
preemption, they instead have mustered scant evidence and, 
at best, have demonstrated ambiguity.  For example, they 
discuss § 601 of the Federal Aviation Act, which empowers 
the FAA to promulgate regulations “to promote safety of 
flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing . . . 
minimum standards governing the design, materials, 
workmanship, construction, and performance of aircraft, 
aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required in the 
interest of safety.”  Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 
85-726, § 601(a)(1), 72 Stat. 731, 775.  Yet, that provision, 
along with § 603, which provides the statutory framework for 
the issuance of type certificates, was adopted verbatim from 
the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, id. § 603; see H.R. Rep. No. 
85-2360, at 16 (1958), which clearly did not preempt state 
law products liability claims, see supra, Part III.B.  Neither 
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the Federal Aviation Act nor subsequent amendments 
substantially changed this statutory framework.  See Revision 
of Title 49, United States Code Annotated, “Transportation,” 
Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994); see also H.R. Rep. 
No. 103-180, at 343-44 (1993) (discussing changes to the 
statutory provisions governing the issuance of type 
certificates as words “added for clarity” and “omitted as 
surplus”).  
 Appellees thus present no evidence from the Federal 
Aviation Act’s text or extensive legislative history that 
plausibly suggests Congress intended these same provisions 
to have a different meaning in the 1958 Act than they had in 
the 1938 Act.  Simply put, if Congress had wanted to change 
the preemptive effect of the type certification process, it 
would have done so—or at least given some indication of that 
intention.  It did not.  The Federal Aviation Act itself 
therefore does not signal an intent to preempt state law 
products liability claims.  
2. Federal Aviation Regulations 
The federal aviation design regulations are likewise 
devoid of evidence of congressional intent to preempt state 
law products liability claims.  The FAA, in the letter brief it 
submitted as amicus curiae in this case, takes the position that 
the Act and these regulations so pervasively occupy the field 
of design safety that, consistent with Abdullah, they require 
state tort suits that survive a conflict preemption analysis to 
proceed under “federal standards of care found in the Federal 
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Aviation Act and its implementing regulations.”  Letter Br. of 
Amicus Curiae Fed. Aviation Admin. 11 (“FAA Ltr. Br.”). 9 
 We do not defer to an agency’s view that its 
regulations preempt state law, but we do recognize that 
agencies are well equipped to understand the technical and 
complex nature of the subject matter over which they regulate 
and thus have a “unique understanding of the statutes they 
administer and an attendant ability to make informed 
determinations about how state requirements may pose an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 
576-77 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Farina, 625 F.3d 
at 126.  We therefore consider the FAA’s “explanation of 
state law’s impact on the federal scheme” governing aircraft 
design and manufacture, but “[t]he weight we accord [its] 
explanation . . . depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and 
persuasiveness.”  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 577 (citing United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001); Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); Farina, 625 F.3d at 
126-27 & n.27.  Specifically, its views as presented in an 
                                              
 9 At our request, the FAA submitted a letter brief 
specifically to address the scope of field preemption, the 
existence and source of any federal standard of care for 
design defect claims, and the role of the type certificate in 
determining whether the relevant standard of care had been 
met.  For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded by 
the FAA’s position on field preemption and the applicable 
standard of care.  However, we do find persuasive its views 
on the relevance of the type certification process to a conflict 
preemption analysis.  See infra Part III.D.2.  
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amicus brief are “‘entitled to respect’ only to the extent [they] 
ha[ve] the ‘power to persuade.’”  See Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
140); see also Farina, 625 F.3d at 126-27. 
Here, three fundamental differences between the 
regulations at issue in Abdullah and those concerning aircraft 
design, along with the agency’s inability to specifically 
identify or articulate the proposed federal standard of care, 
lead us to disagree with this aspect of the FAA’s submission.  
First, the regulations governing in-flight operations on their 
face “prescribe[] rules governing the operation of aircraft . . .  
within the United States.”  14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a); see also 14 
C.F.R. § 121.1(e) (prescribing rules governing “[e]ach person 
who is on board an aircraft being operated under this part”).  
In contrast, the manufacturing and design regulations 
prescribe “[p]rocedural requirements for issuing and changing 
– (i) Design approvals; (ii) Production approvals; (iii) 
Airworthiness certificates; and (iv) Airworthiness approvals” 
and “[r]ules governing applicants for, and holders of” such 
approvals and certificates.  14 C.F.R. § 21.1(a).  That is, these 
regulations do not purport to govern the manufacture and 
design of aircraft per se or to establish a general standard of 
care but rather establish procedures for manufacturers to 
obtain certain approvals and certificates from the FAA, see 
generally 14 C.F.R. § 21, and in the context of those 
procedures, to “prescribe[] airworthiness standards for the 
issue of type certificates,” 14 C.F.R. § 33.1(a) (aircraft 
engines) (emphasis added); see also 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1(a), 
25.1(a), 27.1(a), 29.1(a), 31.1(a), 35.1(a).  Of course, the 
issuance of a type certificate is a threshold requirement for 
the lawful manufacture and production of component parts 
and, at least to that extent, arguably reflects nationwide 
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standards for the manufacture and design of such parts.  But 
the fact that the regulations are framed in terms of standards 
to acquire FAA approvals and certificates—and not as 
standards governing manufacture generally—supports the 
notions that the acquisition of a type certificate is merely a 
baseline requirement and that, in the manufacturing context, 
the statutory language indicating that these are “minimum 
standards,” 49 U.S.C. § 44701, means what it says. 
Second, the standards that must be met for the issuance 
of type certificates cannot be said to provide the type of 
“comprehensive system of rules and regulations” we 
determined existed in Abdullah to promote in-flight safety 
“by regulating pilot certification, pilot pre-flight duties, pilot 
flight responsibilities, and flight rules.”  Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 
369 (footnotes omitted).  Rather, many are in the nature of 
discrete, technical specifications that range from simply 
requiring that a given component part work properly, e.g., 14 
C.F.R. § 33.71(a) (providing that a lubrication system “must 
function properly in the flight altitudes and atmospheric 
conditions in which an aircraft is expected to operate”), to 
prescribing particular specifications for certain aspects (and 
not even all aspects) of that component part, e.g., 14 C.F.R.   
§ 33.69 (providing that an electric engine ignition system 
“must have at least two igniters and two separate secondary 
electric circuits, except that only one igniter is required for 
fuel burning augmentation systems”).  The regulation 
governing the fuel and induction system at issue in this case, 
for example, specifies that this part of the engine “must be 
designed and constructed to supply an appropriate mixture of 
fuel to the cylinders throughout the complete operating range 
of the engine under all flight and atmospheric conditions.”  14 
C.F.R. § 33.35(a) (emphasis added).  As the District Court 
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observed, the highly technical and part-specific nature of 
these regulations makes them exceedingly difficult to 
translate into a standard of care that could be applied to a tort 
claim. 
Third, the regulations governing in-flight operations 
“suppl[y] a comprehensive standard of care,” Abdullah, 181 
F.3d at 371, that could be used to evaluate conduct not 
specifically prescribed by the regulations, i.e., that a person 
must not “operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner 
so as to endanger the life or property of another,” 14 C.F.R.   
§ 91.13(a).  We recognized in Abdullah that § 91.13(a) 
sounds in common law tort, making it appropriate and 
practical to incorporate as a federal standard of care in state 
law claims concerning in-flight operations and rendering 
existing state law standards of care duplicative (if not 
conflicting with them outright).  Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371, 
374.  Neither the FAA nor Appellees have pointed us to any 
analogous provision for aircraft manufacture and design, nor 
have we identified one.10   
                                              
 10 Although Appellees suggest 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5) 
and CAR §§ 13.100-101, 13.104 (1964) as candidates for an 
equivalent to § 91.13(a), neither states a workable standard of 
care.  The first simply describes what types of regulations the 
FAA is authorized to promulgate by directing the agency to 
prescribe “regulations and minimum standards for other 
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds 
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.”  
49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5).  The second establishes “standards 
with which compliance shall be demonstrated for the issuance 
of and changes to type certificates for engines used on 
aircraft.”  CAR § 13.0 (1964).  Neither provision purports to, 
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We therefore agree with the District Court that neither 
the Federal Aviation Act nor the associated FAA regulations 
“were [ever] intended to create federal standards of care” for 
manufacturing and design defect claims.  Sikkelee, 45 F. 
Supp. 3d at 437 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(describing the District Court’s reasoning in its earlier 
memorandum responding to proposed jury instructions and 
citing Pease, 2011 WL 6339833, at *22-23).  However, the 
District Court proceeded from that accurate premise to a 
faulty conclusion (the one urged by Appellees), i.e., that 
because there is no federal standard of care for these claims in 
the statute or regulations, the issuance of a type certificate 
must both establish and satisfy that standard.  Not so.  In light 
of the presumption against preemption, absent clear evidence 
that Congress intended the mere issuance of a type certificate 
to foreclose all design defect claims, state tort suits using state 
standards of care may proceed subject only to traditional 
conflict preemption principles.       
Besides preserving principles of federalism, this 
conclusion avoids interpreting the Federal Aviation Act in a 
way that would have “the perverse effect of granting 
complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire 
industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more 
stringent regulation.”  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487.  
Conversely, were we to adopt Appellees’ position, we would 
be holding, in effect, that the mere issuance of a type 
certificate exempts designers and manufacturers of defective 
airplanes from the bulk of liability for both individual and 
large-scale air catastrophes.   While Appellees answer that 
                                                                                                     
nor could, practically function as a general standard of care 
for products liability claims. 
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“failure to report defects” claims could still proceed under 
state law, as the District Court permitted here, even Appellees 
acknowledge that, at best, only some “percentage of claims 
that are theoretically available would be left under [their] 
interpretation . . . .”  Oral Arg. at 35:01, 42:54 (argued June 
24, 2015).11   
In short, like the manufacturer in Medtronic, Appellees 
would have us adopt the position that “because there is no 
explicit private cause of action against manufacturers 
contained in the [Act], and no suggestion that the Act created 
an implied private right of action, Congress would have 
barred most, if not all, relief for persons injured by defective 
[aircraft parts].”  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487.  Like the 
Supreme Court in Medtronic, however, we find it “to say the 
least, ‘difficult to believe that Congress would, without 
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those 
injured by illegal conduct.’”  Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).   
 These observations lead us to conclude that the Federal 
Aviation Act and its implementing regulations do not indicate 
a clear and manifest congressional intent to preempt state law 
products liability claims; Congress has not created a federal 
standard of care for persons injured by defective airplanes; 
and the type certification process cannot as a categorical 
matter displace the need for compliance in this context with 
state standards of care.      
                                              
11 An audio recording of the oral argument is available 
online, at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/14-
4193JillSilleleev.PrecisionAirmotiveCorp.mp3. 
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3. GARA  
 Our conclusion is solidified by the General Aviation 
Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”), Pub L. No. 103-298, 
108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).  In that 
statute, Congress created a statute of repose that, with certain 
exceptions, bars suit against an aircraft manufacturer arising 
from a general aviation accident brought more than eighteen 
years after the aircraft was delivered or a new part was 
installed.12  49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § 3(3).  GARA was 
adopted to limit the “long tail of liability” imposed on 
manufacturers of general aviation aircraft.  Blazevska v. 
Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 
2001)).   
By barring products liability suits against 
manufacturers of these older aircraft parts, GARA necessarily 
implies that such suits were and are otherwise permitted.  
Indeed, GARA’s eighteen-year statute of repose would be 
superfluous if all aviation products liability claims are 
preempted from day one.  Because we must “interpret a 
statute so as to ‘give effect to every word of a statute 
wherever possible,’” Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting 
Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 165 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 
                                              
12 “General aviation aircraft” is defined in GARA as 
any aircraft with a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 
20 passengers that was not engaged in scheduled passenger-
carrying operations at the time of the accident.  49 U.S.C. 
§ 40101 note § 2(c).  In other words, general aviation is 
distinct from larger-scale commercial aviation.  
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(2004)), GARA reinforces what is now apparent: Federal law 
does not preempt state design defect claims.  Rather, 
Congress left state law remedies in place when it enacted 
GARA in 1994, just as it did when it enacted the Civil 
Aeronautics Act in 1938 and the Federal Aviation Act in 
1958.   
 Appellees argue that GARA would not be entirely 
superfluous because general aviation manufacturers would 
“remain subject to state tort remedies for actual violations of 
federal aviation safety standards,” Appellee’s Br. 51, such as 
the failure to disclose defects discovered after a type 
certificate has been issued or the failure to comply with an 
airworthiness directive, Oral Arg. at 35:20, 37:00.  Those 
kinds of claims, however, are already expressly exempted in 
§ 2(b)(1) from GARA’s statute of repose.13  In sum, if GARA 
                                              
13 In full, this exception provides that GARA’s statute 
of repose does not apply 
 
if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts 
necessary to prove, and proves, that the 
manufacturer with respect to a type certificate 
or airworthiness certificate for, or obligations 
with respect to continuing airworthiness of, an 
aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, 
or other part of an aircraft knowingly 
misrepresented to the Federal Aviation 
Administration, or concealed or withheld from 
the Federal Aviation Administration, required 
information that is material and relevant to the 
performance or the maintenance or operation of 
such aircraft, or the component, system, 
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and its § 2(b)(1) carveout are to serve their stated purpose, the 
state law claims to which GARA’s statute of repose applies 
must not be preempted.   
 Our interpretation of the Federal Aviation Act is only 
bolstered by GARA’s legislative history.  We are mindful, of 
course, that “the authoritative statement is the statutory text, 
not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material,” as 
legislative history can be “murky, ambiguous, and 
contradictory.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).  Here, however, the legislative 
history is none of those things.  GARA’s legislative history 
states explicitly what is implied by the statutory text: Aviation 
products liability claims are governed by state law.  See H.R. 
Rep. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 3-7 (1994).  The House Report 
begins by stating that “[t]he liability of general aviation 
aircraft manufacturers is governed by tort law” that “is 
ultimately grounded in the experiences of the legal system 
and values of the citizens of a particular State.”  Id. at 3-4.  In 
enacting GARA, Congress “voted to permit, in this 
exceptional instance, a very limited Federal preemption of 
                                                                                                     
subassembly, or other part, that is causally 
related to the harm which the claimant allegedly 
suffered.   
 
49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § 2(b)(1).  This provision would 
exempt from the statute of repose claims that are based on a 
manufacturer’s misrepresentations and omissions with regard 
to a type certificate or the continuing airworthiness of a plane 
or its component part, such as a manufacturer’s failure to 
comply with a type certificate or failure to report required 
information to the FAA.   
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State law,” that is, only where GARA’s statute of repose has 
run are state law claims preempted.  Id. at 4-7.  “[I]n cases 
where the statute of repose has not expired, State law will 
continue to govern fully, unfettered by Federal 
interference.”14  Id. at 7. 
                                              
 14 Appellant notes that, as indicated in the House 
Report accompanying GARA, prior legislative efforts to 
explicitly federalize aviation tort law failed to get off the 
ground.  H.R. Rep. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 6 & n.11 
(referencing failed bill H.R. 5362, 102d Cong. (1992)); see 
Appellant’s Br. 9.  For example, H.R. 5362 would have 
explicitly preempted state tort claims against aircraft 
manufacturers arising out of general aviation accidents, put in 
place substantive legal rules for such actions (e.g., applying 
principles of comparative responsibility in such cases), and 
imbued federal courts with original, concurrent jurisdiction to 
adjudicate such claims.  Although Appellant seems to be 
suggesting that such proposed bills reflect Congress’s belief 
at the time that the field of aviation products liability was not 
preempted—and, thus, remains so today absent legislation to 
the contrary—we take no confidence in the reading of tea 
leaves left behind by failed legislative efforts.  For, while on 
rare occasion the Supreme Court has described legislative 
inaction as “instructive” but “not conclusive,” Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), it far more often, and with good 
reason, has emphasized its “reluctan[ce] to draw inferences 
from Congress’[s] failure to act,” Schneidewind v. ANR 
Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306 (1988); see also FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155 
(2000) (declining to “rely on Congress’[s] failure to act”). 
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 Appellees attempt to discount GARA’s significance, 
arguing that the views of Congress in 1994 “form a hazardous 
basis for inferring the intent” of the 1958 Congress that 
enacted the Federal Aviation Act.  Appellee’s Br. 41 (quoting 
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).  It is true 
that “the weight given subsequent legislation and whether it 
constitutes a clarification or a repeal is a context- and fact-
dependent inquiry,” Bd. of Trs. of IBT Local 863 Pension 
Fund v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 802 F.3d 534, 546 
(3d Cir. 2015), but there are circumstances where its 
consideration is appropriate.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
relied on precisely this type of analysis in determining 
congressional intent in the preemption context in Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).  There, the Court 
considered the question of whether state law actions for 
punitive damages were subject to field preemption under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284.  
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 241.  The Atomic Energy Act itself was 
silent on the preemption of state tort claims, but, when it was 
subsequently amended by the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. 
No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), the accompanying Joint 
Committee Report reflected an assumption that state law 
would apply in the absence of subsequent legislative action.  
Id. at 251-54.  The Supreme Court found this legislative 
history to be persuasive in concluding that Congress did not 
intend to foreclose state remedies for those injured by nuclear 
accidents by way of field preemption.  Id. at 256.      
 More recently, in Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), the Supreme Court held that disparate 
impact claims were cognizable under the 1968 Fair Housing 
Act (“FHA”), relying in part on the “crucial[ly] importan[t]” 
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fact that Congress had adopted amendments to the Act in 
1988 that assumed the existence of such claims.  Id. at 2519-
20.  Because the amendments would make sense only if 
disparate impact liability existed under the FHA, the Court 
reasoned that the most logical conclusion was that Congress 
presupposed the existence of disparate impact claims under 
the FHA as it had been enacted in 1968.  Id. at 2520-21.   
 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach and our 
recent guidance in Board of Trustees of IBT Local 863 
Pension Fund, we may pay heed to the significance of 
subsequent legislation when it is apparent from the facts and 
context that it bears directly on Congress’s own 
understanding and intent.  Here, the Federal Aviation Act 
itself neither states nor implies an intent to preempt state law 
products liability claims, and GARA confirms that Congress 
understood and intended that Act to preserve such claims.  
Thus, despite Appellees’ exhortations, we cannot infer a clear 
and manifest congressional purpose to preempt these claims 
where the indicia of congressional intent, including in this 
case the assumptions underlying subsequent legislation, point 
overwhelmingly the other way.             
D. Relevant Preemption Precedent 
 We turn next to Appellees’ contention that the 
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence compels us to find 
that federal law occupies the entire field of aircraft design and 
manufacture and that the issuance of a type certificate 
conclusively demonstrates compliance with the corresponding 
federal standard of care.  Appellees argue that: (1) the Court 
has accorded broad field preemption to analogous statutory 
regimes governing oil tankers and locomotives; (2) the Court 
has given broad preemptive effect to analogous premarket 
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approval processes in the medical device context; and 
(3) other Courts of Appeals have recognized preemption of 
the field of aviation safety.  For its part, the FAA argues that 
the mere issuance of a type certificate does not preempt all 
design defect claims concerning the certificated part but that 
specifications expressly embodied in a type certificate may, in 
a given case, preempt such claims under traditional conflict 
preemption principles.  We address Appellees’ arguments 
below and conclude that the case law of the Supreme Court 
and our sister Circuits supports the application of traditional 
conflict preemption principles but not preemption of the 
entire field of aviation design and manufacture.  
1. Field Preemption in Analogous Statutory 
Regimes 
 Although they acknowledge that the Supreme Court 
has not addressed whether the Federal Aviation Act preempts 
the field of aviation design and manufacture, Appellees argue 
on the basis of other Supreme Court precedent that we should 
affirm the reasoning of the District Court.  First, Appellees 
point to the Supreme Court’s observation in City of Burbank, 
411 U.S. at 639, that the Federal Aviation Act “requires a 
uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the 
congressional objectives underlying [it] are to be fulfilled” as 
evidence that the Supreme Court has concluded the FAA 
occupies the entire field of aviation safety.  That begs the 
question, however, of the scope of the field in question.  In 
City of Burbank, the Court held only that Congress had 
preempted the field of aircraft noise regulation.  Id. at 633, 
638-40.  Even in interpreting the express preemption clause 
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of the Airline Deregulation Act, 15 the Court has taken a 
cautious approach, holding that plaintiffs’ claims under state 
consumer protection statutes are preempted but that related 
state law claims for breach of contract are not.  See Am. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223, 227-33 (1995); 
Morales, 504 U.S. at 391.  The Supreme Court also has 
observed in dicta that state tort law “plainly appl[ies]” to 
aviation tort cases and that Congress would need to enact 
legislation “[i]f federal uniformity is the desired goal with 
respect to claims arising from aviation accidents.”  Exec. Jet 
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 273-74 
(1972).  The Court’s few pronouncements in the area of 
aviation preemption, in other words, offer little support for 
the broad field preemption Appellees seek.  
Appellees next compare aircraft to oil tankers and 
locomotives, urging that the broad scope of field preemption 
recognized by the Supreme Court in those industries should 
extend as well to aircraft design defect claims.  As Appellees 
point out, the Supreme Court has found field preemption of 
oil tanker design, operation, and seaworthiness under Title II 
of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and concluded state 
regulations that impose additional crew training requirements 
and mandate standard safety features on certain boats fall 
within this preempted field.  United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 
                                              
 15 The Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 
§ 105(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (1978), expressly preempted 
state law claims “relating to rates, routes, or services of any 
air carrier.”  In light of nonsubstantive amendments by 
Congress, today’s iteration of the express preemption clause 
precludes state law claims “related to a price, route, or service 
of an air carrier.”  49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). 
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89, 109-14 (2000); Ray, 435 U.S. at 158-68.  Appellees also 
refer to decisions that have found field preemption of design 
defect claims in the railroad context, see Kurns v. R.R. 
Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1267-68 (2012); Del. 
& Hudson Ry. Co. v. Knoedler Mfrs., Inc., 781 F.3d 656, 661-
62 (3d Cir. 2015).   
We do not find either of these analogies apt.  As to 
tankers, the Supreme Court subsequently distinguished Ray 
and Locke on the grounds that both cases invalidated state 
regulations that created positive obligations, and neither of 
those cases “purported to pre-empt possible common law 
claims,” Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 
(2002), such as the aviation tort claims at issue here.  As to 
locomotives, the Supreme Court and our own Court were 
bound to find such design defect claims preempted by the 
Supreme Court’s ninety-year-old precedent in Napier v. 
Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), which 
held that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempts “the field 
of regulating locomotive equipment used on a highway of 
interstate commerce,” including “the design, the construction, 
and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender 
and of all appurtenances.”  Id. at 607, 611. 
Far more apropos in the transportation industry is the 
Supreme Court’s conflict preemption approach in the context 
of automobiles and boats, for just as the Federal Aviation Act 
directs the FAA to “prescrib[e] minimum standards required 
in the interest of safety for appliances and for the design, 
material, construction, quality of work, and performance of 
aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers,” 49 U.S.C.                
§ 44701(a)(1), the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 
1966 (“NTMSA”) empowers the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration to “prescribe motor vehicle safety 
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standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment,” 
49 U.S.C. § 30101(1), and the Federal Boat Safety Act of 
1971 (“FBSA”) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to 
issue regulations “establishing minimum safety standards for 
recreational vessels and associated equipment,” 46 U.S.C.     
§ 4302(a)(1).16  Moreover, like the Federal Aviation Act, the 
NTMSA and FBSA both contain savings clauses.  49 U.S.C. 
§ 30103(e); 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).  
In assessing implied preemption under these statutory 
schemes, the Supreme Court has found that the statutory 
language and applicable regulations support not field 
preemption, but rather a traditional conflict preemption 
analysis.  In the automobile context, for example, the Court 
held that a federal regulation governing air bag usage 
implicated a significant federal regulatory objective—
maintaining manufacturer choice—and therefore preempted a 
state law tort claim, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861, 875, 886 (2000), while another regulation governing 
seatbelt usage did not reflect a similarly significant federal 
                                              
 16 Appellees argue that the Federal Aviation Act’s 
mandate that the FAA Administrator establish “minimum” 
standards in both Section 604 (pertaining to operations) and 
Section 601(a) (pertaining to aircraft design and manufacture) 
justifies the extension of Abdullah field preemption to both 
areas.  Appellees’ Br. 34 (citing §§ 101(3), (10), (21); 
601(a)(1)-(5)).  In Abdullah, however, we observed that the 
reference to “minimum standards” did not preclude a finding 
of field preemption; we did not hold that it required or even 
supported it.  See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 373-74.  
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objective and thus did not preempt state law claims, 
Williamson, 562 U.S. at 336.   
 Similarly, in Sprietsma, the Court held that the Federal 
Boat Safety Act did not preempt the field of “state common 
law relating to boat manufacture,” but nonetheless applied a 
conflict preemption analysis to determine whether petitioner’s 
tort law claims were preempted by the Federal Boat Safety 
Act (“FBSA”) or the Coast Guard’s decision not to 
promulgate a regulation requiring propeller guards on 
motorboats.  537 U.S. at 60-70.  The Court held that the Coast 
Guard’s decision not to regulate did not preclude “a tort 
verdict premised on a jury’s finding that some type of 
propeller guard should have been installed on this particular 
kind of boat equipped with respondent’s particular type of 
motor” because the Coast Guard’s decision “does not convey 
an ‘authoritative’ message of a federal policy against 
propeller guards.”  Id. at 67.17 
                                              
17 We recognize that, unlike the Federal Aviation Act, 
the NTMSA and the FBSA also contain express preemption 
clauses.  49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1); 46 U.S.C. § 4306.  Despite 
these clauses, however, the Supreme Court still conducted a 
conflict preemption analysis in Geier and Sprietsma rather 
than a field preemption analysis because it determined that, 
while an express preemption clause may indicate some 
congressional desire to “subject the industry to a single, 
uniform set of federal safety standards,” the presence of a 
savings clause simultaneously “reflects a congressional 
determination that occasional nonuniformity is a small price 
to pay for a system in which juries . . . enforce[] safety 
standards [and] . . . provid[e] necessary compensation to 
victims.”  Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-71; see also Sprietsma, 537 
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 In sum, the Supreme Court’s preemption cases in the 
transportation context support that aircraft design and 
manufacture claims are not field preempted, but remain 
subject to principles of conflict preemption.  
2. Type Certification As Support for Field 
Preemption 
Appellees also assert that because type certificates 
represent the FAA’s determination that a design meets federal 
safety standards, allowing juries to impose tort liability 
notwithstanding the presence of a type certificate would 
infringe upon the field of aviation safety as defined in 
Abdullah and would fatally undermine uniformity in the 
federal regulatory regime.  Appellees’ Br. 44-45 (quoting City 
of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639).  In support of this argument, 
Appellees rely on Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 
(2008), in which state tort claims were deemed preempted by 
an express preemption clause where the plaintiff challenged 
the safety of a medical device that had received preapproval 
from the Food and Drug Administration.  Id. at 330.  
Although there is no express preemption clause here, 
Appellees posit that the FAA’s type certification process 
should be accorded a similar field preemptive effect. 
The FAA, on the other hand, argues that type 
certification is relevant only to an analysis under “ordinary 
                                                                                                     
U.S. at 62-65.  Because the Court has been willing to apply 
conflict rather than field preemption even in situations where 
an express preemption clause is at play, conflict preemption 
appears especially apt in a case like this one where there is no 
such clause to counsel in favor of field preemption. 
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conflict preemption principles.” 18  FAA Ltr. Br. 2.  Thus, 
according to the FAA, “[i]t is . . . only where compliance with 
both the type certificate and the claims made in the state tort 
suit ‘is a physical impossibility[]’; or where the claim ‘stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress,’ that the type certificate 
will serve to preempt a state tort suit.”  Id. at 10 (first quoting 
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43; then 
quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 873).  This, the FAA contends, 
strikes the right balance in the interests of federalism because: 
to the extent that a plaintiff challenges an aspect 
of an aircraft’s design that was expressly 
approved by the FAA as shown on the type 
certificate, accompanying operating limitations, 
underlying type certificate data sheet, or other 
form of FAA approval incorporated by 
reference into those materials, a plaintiff’s state 
tort suit arguing for an alternative design would 
be preempted under conflict preemption 
principles . . . . because a manufacturer is bound 
to manufacture its aircraft or aircraft part in 
compliance with the type certificate.   
Id. at 10-11.  On the other hand, “to the extent that the FAA 
has not made an affirmative determination with respect to the 
challenged design aspect, and the agency has left that design 
                                              
 
18  Even with regard to those claims not preempted by 
conflict preemption, the FAA contends that a federal standard 
of care should apply.  FAA Ltr. Br. 11.  For the reasons set 
forth above, we have rejected that contention.  See supra Part 
III.C.2. 
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aspect to the manufacturer’s discretion, the claim would not 
be preempted.”  Id. at 11.19   
We have no need here to demarcate the boundaries of 
those tort suits that will be preempted as a result of a conflict 
between state law and a given type certificate, nor which 
FAA documents incorporated by reference in a type 
certificate might give rise to such a conflict.  While the 
parties responded to the FAA’s submission by arguing for the 
first time in supplemental submissions whether the alleged 
design defect at issue in this case is a design aspect that was 
expressly incorporated into the type certificate for the Textron 
Lycoming O-320-D2C engine and what significance that 
might have for conflict preemption, we will leave those issues 
for the District Court to consider on remand.  See, e.g., Miller 
v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 2010) (remanding 
consideration of an issue discussed in supplemental briefing 
on appeal but not addressed by the district court in the first 
instance).  For today, we hold only that, consistent with the 
FAA’s view, type certification does not itself establish or 
satisfy the relevant standard of care for tort actions, nor does 
it evince congressional intent to preempt the field of products 
liability; rather, because the type certification process results 
                                              
 19 A type certificate thus would not create such a 
conflict in the FAA’s view where unilateral changes are 
permissible without preapproval or where an allegation of 
negligence arises after the issuance of a type certificate, such 
as claims related to a manufacturer’s maintenance of an 
aircraft, issuance of service bulletins to correct an issue that 
has come to the manufacturer’s attention, or failure to 
conform its manufacturing process to the specifications in the 
type certificate.  See FAA Ltr. Br. 10-11, 12-13 n.2. 
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in the FAA’s preapproval of particular specifications from 
which a manufacturer may not normally deviate without 
violating federal law, the type certificate bears on ordinary 
conflict preemption principles.  See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576-
77 (according “some weight” to an agency’s “unique 
understanding” of “state law’s impact on [a] federal scheme” 
insofar as its views are “thorough[], consisten[t], and 
persuasive[]”); accord Farina, 625 F.3d at 126-27.   
Indeed, when confronting an analogous preapproval 
scheme for pharmaceutical labeling, the Supreme Court has 
held that, where manufacturers are unable to simultaneously 
comply with both federal and state requirements, state law 
design defect claims are conflict preempted, not field 
preempted.  See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 
2473 (2013); PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577.  Before a new drug 
may legally be distributed in the United States, both its 
contents and its labeling must be preapproved by the FDA.  
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a), (b)(1)(F).  In a series of recent 
preemption cases, the Court has distinguished between brand-
name drugs and their generic equivalents, determining that at 
least some state law tort claims may be brought against 
brand-name drug companies because such companies have 
the ability to make some unilateral changes to their labels 
without additional regulatory preapproval, Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 
572-73, 581, but such claims against generic drug 
manufacturers cannot survive a conflict preemption analysis 
because the generic manufacturers are bound by federal law 
to directly mimic their brand-name counterparts, Bartlett, 133 
S. Ct. at 2473, 2480; PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577-81.20  
                                              
20 In the case of a new brand-name drug, FDA approval 
can be secured only by submitting a new drug application 
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Ultimately, where a party cannot “independently do under 
federal law what state law requires of it,” the state law is 
conflict preempted.  PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579.  
The same considerations apply to the case before us.  
The FAA’s preapproval process for specifications embodied 
or incorporated into a type certificate, which precludes a 
manufacturer from making at least “major changes” 21 to a 
                                                                                                     
(“NDA”), which must include full reports of clinical 
investigations, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A), relevant nonclinical 
studies, 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(2), “any other data or 
information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and 
effectiveness of the drug product obtained or otherwise 
received by the applicant from any source,” 21 C.F.R. 
§ (d)(5)(iv), and “the labeling proposed to be used for such 
drug,” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F).  The FDA approves an NDA 
only if it determines that the drug in question is safe for use 
under its proposed labeling and the drug’s probable 
therapeutic benefits outweigh its risk of harm.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(d); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 
140.  In contrast, a manufacturer of generic drugs can 
piggyback off of a previously-approved brand-name drug, but 
is required by federal law to match the preapproved brand-
name analogue’s labeling and composition exactly.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A). 
 
21 As previously described, a company may not 
manufacture, much less produce, an aircraft part until its 
proposed design, to the extent described in its application, has 
been approved by the FAA in a type certificate.  See supra, 
Part I.A.  Once approved, there are two basic mechanisms by 
which a change can be made, depending whether the change 
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design aspect without further preapproval, means a 
manufacturer may well find it impossible to simultaneously 
comply with both a type certificate’s specifications and a 
separate—and perhaps more stringent—state tort duty.  Thus, 
there may be cases where a manufacturer’s compliance with 
both the type certificate and a state law standard of care “is a 
                                                                                                     
is a “major change” or “minor change.”  See 14 C.F.R. 
§ 21.93.  For “major changes,” a manufacturer cannot alter its 
design without obtaining preapproval and an amended type 
certificate from the FAA.  See 49 U.S.C. § 44704(b); 14 
C.F.R. § 21.97.  Even where a manufacturer identifies and 
reports a defect, it may not unilaterally make a major change 
to its preapproved design; instead, the FAA must either 
preapprove such a change or issue an airworthiness directive 
that provides legally enforceable instructions to make the 
product safe.  See supra, Part I.A.  “Minor changes,” on the 
other hand, “may be approved under a method acceptable to 
the FAA before submitting to the FAA any substantiating or 
descriptive data.”  14 C.F.R. § 21.95.  Importantly, “[t]he 
FAA permits a wide latitude in the approval process for 
minor changes to type design,” FAA, Order 8110.4C, change 
5, Type Certification, ch. 4-1 (2011), allowing, for example, 
for manufacturers holding a certain, separately-applied-for 
authorization from the FAA (a so-called “technical standard 
order authorization”) to “make minor design changes . . . 
without further approval by the FAA,” 14 C.F.R. § 21.619(a).  
Under the regulations, then, it appears that “major changes” 
to the design aspects expressly set forth in or incorporated 
into a type certificate require preapproval, whereas “minor 
changes,” depending on the “method acceptable to the FAA,” 
14 C.F.R. § 21.95, may not.   
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physical impossibility,” Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 
373 U.S. at 142-43, or would pose an obstacle to Congress’s 
purposes and objectives.  In such cases, the state law claim 
would be conflict preempted.  For, even if an alternative 
design aspect would improve safety, the mere “possibility” 
that the FAA would approve a hypothetical application for an 
alteration does not make it possible to comply with both 
federal and state requirements: As the Supreme Court 
observed in PLIVA, if that were enough, conflict preemption 
would be “all but meaningless.”  131 S. Ct. at 2579. 
 As for Appellees’ reliance on Riegel, we agree that the 
FAA’s type certification process resembles the “‘rigorous’” 
preapproval process for certain medical devices under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1939) (amended 1976).  Riegel, 552 
U.S. at 317 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477).  Not unlike type 
certification, this approval process involves copious 
submissions and exhaustive review, and the FDA grants 
approval only if a device is deemed both safe and effective.  
Id. at 317-19.  In addition, just as aircraft manufacturers may 
not make major changes to or deviate from their type 
certificates without the FAA’s sign-off, certain medical 
device manufacturers may not deviate from a federally 
sanctioned design without first obtaining supplemental 
approval from the FDA.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i); 
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319.  However, unlike the Federal 
Aviation Act, the statute governing medical devices includes 
an express preemption clause that forbids states from 
imposing “requirements” that are “different from, or in 
addition to” federal requirements placed on medical devices.  
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316.  Because the 
Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in Riegel hinged on its 
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interpretation of this express preemption clause, the case 
provides no support for the general proposition that states 
may not regulate devices governed by a federal statutory 
scheme. 
 Moreover, in an important respect, Riegel cuts against 
a finding of field preemption in this case, particularly when 
read in conjunction with the Court’s prior medical device 
decision in Lohr.  Together these cases reflect a narrow, 
rather than sweeping, approach to analyzing the preemptive 
contours of a federal premarket approval scheme.  In Lohr, 
finding that the “overarching concern” of the federal statutory 
and regulatory scheme was ensuring “that pre-emption occur 
only where a particular state requirement threatens to 
interfere with a specific federal interest,” the Court preserved 
state common law requirements “equal to, or substantially 
identical to, requirements imposed under federal law.”  518 
U.S. at 497, 500-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Subsequently, in Riegel, although the Court held that state 
design defect claims were preempted where they imposed 
additional safety requirements on medical device 
manufacturers in violation of the express preemption clause, 
the Court left Lohr intact and took care to note that state 
duties that “‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal 
requirements” are not preempted by the statute.  552 U.S. at 
330.  Here, confronted with a similarly exhaustive 
preapproval process governing aircraft manufacture and 
design and no express preemption clause, we see no 
justification for going further than the Supreme Court elected 
to go in Riegel or Lohr by deeming categorically preempted 
even those state requirements that may be consistent with the 
federal regulatory scheme as embodied in the FAA’s type 
certificates.  We thus read Riegel not to bestow field 
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preemptive effect on type certificates, but rather to counsel in 
favor of narrowly construing the effect of federal regulations 
on state law—much like the conflict preemption analysis 
undertaken in Bartlett and PLIVA. 
3. Aviation Preemption Precedent in the 
Courts of Appeals 
 With a dearth of support for the proposition that the 
field of aircraft design and manufacture is preempted, 
Appellees attempt to muster support from select language in 
the opinions of other Courts of Appeals.  Their efforts are 
unavailing. 
 Appellees observe that various Courts of Appeals have 
described the entire field of aviation safety as preempted, but, 
on inspection, even those courts have carefully circumscribed 
the scope of those rulings.  The Second, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits all assess the scope of the field of aviation safety by 
examining the pervasiveness of the regulations in a particular 
area rather than simply determining whether the area 
implicated by the lawsuit concerns an aspect of air safety.  
See Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1006 
(9th Cir. 2013) (inquiring as to “whether the particular area of 
aviation commerce and safety implicated by the lawsuit is 
governed by pervasive federal regulations” (quoting Martin, 
555 F.3d at 811) (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Goodspeed Airport L.L.C. v. E. Haddam Inland 
Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210-11 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (“[C]oncluding that Congress intended to occupy 
the field of air safety does not end our task. . . .  [T]he inquiry 
is twofold; we must determine not only Congressional intent 
to preempt, but also the scope of that preemption. ‘The key 
question is thus at what point the state regulation sufficiently 
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interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed 
pre-empted[.]’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Gade 
v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992))); 
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1329 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (“Based on the pervasive federal regulations 
concerning flight attendant and crew member training and the 
aviation safety concerns involved when regulating an airline’s 
alcoholic beverage service, we conclude that NMLCA’s 
application to an airline implicates the field of airline safety 
that Congress intended federal law to regulate 
exclusively.”).22 
                                              
 22 Thus, although described as field preemption, these 
two-part tests define the relevant “field” so narrowly as to 
result in an analysis that resembles conventional conflict 
preemption.  See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 330 (asking 
“whether, in fact, the state tort action conflicts with the 
federal regulation” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Indeed, in Gade v. National Solid Wastes 
Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103-04 (1992) (plurality 
opinion), on which the Second Circuit relied in Goodspeed to 
articulate its test, the Supreme Court rested its plurality 
opinion on conflict preemption rather than field preemption.  
See Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 209 n.4, 210-11 (recognizing that 
the categories of preemption “are not rigidly distinct,” but 
that, while field preemption may be considered a “subset of 
conflict preemption,” courts often recognize field preemption 
and conflict preemption as separate doctrinal categories 
(citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)). 
 
 Notably, several district courts have also rejected field 
preemption in the aviation context and thereafter considered 
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 In any event, to date, the Courts of Appeals have held 
that aviation products liability claims are not preempted, 
although they have taken a variety of different approaches to 
reach that result.  See Martin, 555 F.3d at 812; Greene v. B.F. 
Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 788-89, 794-95 
(6th Cir. 2005); Pub. Health Trust, 992 F.2d at 294-95; 
Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1442-47.  The Ninth Circuit has held 
that the entire field of aviation safety is preempted, Montalvo 
v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468-69 (9th Cir. 2007), but 
that products liability claims are not within that preempted 
field, drawing a line between areas of law where the FAA has 
issued “pervasive regulations”—such as passenger warnings, 
id. (concluding that state law negligence claims for failure to 
warn passengers of medical risks accompanying long flights 
are preempted), and pilot qualifications, Ventress v. Japan 
Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 721-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 164 (2014) (holding state law claims implicating pilot 
qualifications and medical standards fall within the preempted 
field of aviation safety because “unlike aircraft stairs, [they] 
are pervasively regulated”)—and other areas where the FAA 
has not—such as products liability claims for allegedly 
defective airstairs, Martin, 555 F.3d at 808-11.  
 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, in addressing 
products liability claims, have held that not only are those 
                                                                                                     
whether conflict preemption applies.  See, e.g., Sheesley v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. Civ. 02-4185, 03-5011, 03-5063, 
2006 WL 1084103, at *23 (D.S.D. 2006); Monroe v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 836 (E.D. Tex. 2006); 
Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 
1400 (D. Haw. 1990). 
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claims governed by state law, but also that the entire field of 
aviation safety is not preempted.  See Pub. Health Trust, 992 
F.2d at 295; Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1447.  While the basis for 
their broader holdings is now in doubt, 23 both of those 
                                              
23 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits both relied in part 
on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), and 
the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude 
that because products liability claims were outside the scope 
of the ADA’s express preemption clause, they were not 
preempted.  Although this employment of expressio unius has 
been called into question by more recent Supreme Court 
authority, see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 
872-73 (2000), courts in the Eleventh Circuit continue to 
apply Public Health’s broad holding, see Branche v. Airtran 
Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1253-55 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Psalmond v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-2327, 2014 
WL 1232149, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2014); North v. 
Precision Airmotive Corp., No. 6:08-cv-2020, 2011 WL 
679932, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2011).   
  
 The fate of Cleveland is less certain.  In O’Donnell, 
the Tenth Circuit reversed course and held that the field of 
aviation safety is preempted.  O’Donnell, 627 F.3d at 1322.  
Several district courts, including the District Court here, have 
stated without explanation that Cleveland has been abrogated 
by O’Donnell.  See, e.g., Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 448 n.16.  
While O’Donnell narrowed Cleveland’s holding, it did not 
purport to overturn Cleveland’s application to products 
liability claims, but rather concluded that it “does not dictate 
the outcome in this case.”  627 F.3d at 1326.  Thus, 
Cleveland’s holding that products liability claims are not 
preempted still appears to be the law of the Tenth Circuit.   
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Circuits still hold that aviation products liability claims are 
governed by state law.  The Sixth Circuit’s approach is most 
difficult to decipher: In a single opinion, it relied on Abdullah 
for the proposition that “federal law establishes the standards 
of care in the field of aviation safety and thus preempts the 
field from state regulation” yet also applied Kentucky tort law 
to a design defect products liability claim involving a 
navigational instrument.  Greene, 409 F.3d at 788-89, 794-95.  
The most logical reading of Greene is that it holds products 
liability claims not to be preempted, as any other 
interpretation would render futile its extensive analysis of the 
design defect claim under state law.  See Martin, 555 F.3d at 
811; McWilliams v. S.E., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888-92 
(N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 Even those Courts of Appeals that have not directly 
addressed the issue have adopted approaches to aviation 
preemption that suggest they would reach a similar result.  
The Seventh Circuit has clearly indicated its understanding 
that state law applies to aviation products liability claims.  See 
Bennett, 484 F.3d at 908-09 (“Defendants’ early theory that 
federal law occupies the field of aviation safety and thus 
‘completely preempts’ all state law has been abandoned. . . .  
Illinois tort law supplies the claim for relief.  On that much all 
parties agree.  For decades aviation suits have been litigated 
in state court when the parties were not of diverse 
citizenship.”).  And the Fifth Circuit has found field 
preemption only of the narrower field of passenger safety 
warnings, Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 385 
(5th Cir. 2004), and otherwise has applied state law to 
aviation products liability claims, e.g., McLennan, 245 F.3d at 
425-26. 
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 In sum, no federal appellate court has held an aviation 
products liability claim to be subject to a federal standard of 
care or otherwise field preempted, and Appellees have been 
unable to identify a single decision from any court, other than 
the District Court here, that has held the mere issuance of a 
type certificate conclusively establishes a defendant’s 
compliance with the relevant standard of care. 
E. The Parties’ Policy Arguments 
In addition to their legal arguments, the parties present 
various policy arguments in support of their respective 
positions.  While we are not unsympathetic to those 
arguments, they carry no sway in face of clear evidence of 
congressional intent and the guidance we draw from the 
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, for 
the sake of completeness, we address those arguments briefly 
here. 
First, in support of field preemption and a federal 
standard of care, Appellees and their amici warn that allowing 
state tort law to govern design defect claims will open up 
aviation manufacturers to tremendous potential liability and 
the unpredictability of non-uniform standards applied by 
juries throughout the states.  See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Curiae 
Gen. Aviation Mfrs. Ass’n 18-24.  Even if we accepted the 
premise that members of the aviation manufacturing industry 
would suffer more harm from exposure to tort liability than 
any other manufacturer that sells its products in all fifty 
states, this policy argument could not lead us to find field 
preemption without the requisite congressional intent.  And as 
even the FAA acknowledges, “[a]lthough allowing a 
defendant to be held liable for a design defect in an engine 
that has received a type certificate from the FAA is in some 
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tension with Congress’s interest in national uniformity in 
safety standards with oversight by a single federal agency, 
Congress struck a balance between protecting these interests 
in uniformity and permitting States to compensate accident 
victims.”  FAA Ltr. Br. 12. 
Nor are we moved by Appellees’ predictions of the 
dire consequences to aircraft and component manufacturers of 
permitting products liability claims to proceed under state tort 
law, for our holding does not effect a sea change.  On the 
contrary, it simply maintains the status quo that has existed 
since the inception of the aviation industry, preserving state 
tort remedies for people injured or killed in plane crashes 
caused by manufacturing and design defects.  That status quo 
leaves intact the traditional deterrence mechanism of a state 
standard of care, with attendant remedies for its breach.  
Thus, while perhaps contrary to certain policies identified by 
Appellees and their amici, our holding furthers an overriding 
public policy and one we conclude is consistent with the 
Federal Aviation Act, FAA regulations, GARA, and decisions 
of the Supreme Court and our sister Circuits: promoting 
aviation safety.  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(1)-(3), 44701(a).    
 On the other side of this debate, in arguing that type 
certificates should have no significance for conflict 
preemption, much less field preemption, Appellant contends 
that FAA preapproval of particular specifications provides no 
assurance of safety because the FAA delegates ninety percent 
of its certification activities to private individuals and 
organizations, known as designees, which can include the 
manufacturers themselves.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
GAO-05-40, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the 
Management of Its Designee Programs 3 (2004); see also 
Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) 
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(“Instead of sending a cadre of inspectors to check whether 
every aircraft design meets every particular of every federal 
rule and policy, the FAA allows [manufacturers] to do some 
of the checking [themselves].”).  We too have recognized that 
designees receive inconsistent monitoring and oversight from 
the FAA, and many have some association with the applicant, 
so that in essence “[s]ome manufacturers are able to grant 
themselves a type certificate.”  Robinson v. Hartzell 
Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 818 n.14 (expressing concern that 
the staff of the FAA “performs only a cursory review of the 
substance of the overwhelming volume of documents 
submitted for its approval” (alteration, internal quotation 
marks, and citation omitted)).  Even the FAA acknowledges 
that, “[i]n light of its limited resources,” the agency 
designates outside organizations to perform some of the 
FAA’s work in preparing a type certificate.  FAA Ltr. Br. 14.   
From these alleged “flaws” in the review process, Appellant 
argues that the agency preapproval of specifications in the 
type certificate amounts to an unreliable self-policing regime 
that should play no role in even conflict preemption. 
 This very same argument, however, was raised in 
Bartlett and failed to carry the day.  While the dissenters 
decried that granting “manufacturers of products that require 
preapproval . . . de facto immunity from design-defect 
liability” would force the public “to rely exclusively on 
imperfect federal agencies with limited resources,” Bartlett, 
133 S. Ct. at 2495 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), the majority 
held that because generic drug manufacturers are required to 
directly mirror the preapproved labels of their brand-name 
counterparts and are thus “prohibited from making any 
unilateral changes” to their labels, state law design defect 
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claims were foreclosed by “a straightforward application of 
pre-emption law,” id. at 2471, 2480.  Although the resource 
limitations and extent of outsourcing of parts of the review 
process highlight the need for the FAA’s vigilant oversight, 
the FAA still makes the ultimate decision to approve the 
particular design specifications sought in a type certificate.  
49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 14 C.F.R. § 21.21.  Thus, the reasoning 
of the Bartlett majority, 133 S. Ct. at 2473, 2480, and the 
consideration we must give to the FAA’s views under 
separation of powers principles, see Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576-
77, lead us to conclude that the FAA’s preapproval process 
for aircraft component part designs must be accorded due 
weight under a conflict preemption analysis. 
 In sum, the parties’ policy arguments notwithstanding, 
the case law of the Supreme Court and our sister Circuits 
confirm our conclusion: We are dealing with an area at the 
heart of state police powers, and we have no indication of 
congressional intent to preempt the entire field of aviation 
design and manufacture.  We therefore decline the invitation 
to create a circuit split and to broaden the scope of Abdullah’s 
field preemption to design defects when the statute, the 
regulations, and relevant precedent militate against it. 
IV. Conclusion 
 We conclude that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment on Sikkelee’s design defect claims on the 
basis of field preemption.  The field of aviation safety we 
identified as preempted in Abdullah does not include product 
manufacture and design, which continues to be governed by 
state tort law, subject to traditional conflict preemption 
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principles.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.24  
                                              
 24 Appellees should address to the District Court in the 
first instance their argument that Sikkelee’s claims fail as a 
matter of Pennsylvania law.  Given the basis for its judgment, 
the District Court had no need to reach that question and it is 
not fairly encompassed within the order certified for this 
interlocutory appeal.  See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 
225 F.3d 379, 407 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to consider on 
interlocutory appeal issues unaddressed by the district court 
below). 
